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Abstract 
A great number of classical Sanskrit texts, most of them philosophical, refer to the Cārvākas or Lokāyatas (also 
Laukāyatikas, Lokāyatikas, Bārhaspatyas) who must have constituted a school of thought which has left us almost 
no literary documents. !ey once possessed a Sūtra text and several commentaries thereon, for fragments have been 
preserved in the works of those who criticise them. In modern secondary literature the Cārvākas are usually referred 
to as “materialists”, which is somewhat unfortunate. It is true that the Sūtra text (sometime called Bārhaspatya Sūtra) 
accepts as only principles (tattva) the four elements earth, water, $re and air; yet the term “materialism” and its cog-
nates evoke in the modern world associations which are not necessarily appropriate for this ancient school of thought.
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¿Quiénes fueron los Carvakas?
Resumen
Un gran número de textos sánscritos, en su mayoría $losó$cos, se re$eren a los Cārvākas o Lokāyatas (también 
Laukāyatikas, Lokāyatikas, Bārhaspatyas) quienes deben haber constituido una escuela de pensamiento que no nos 
ha dejado prácticamente ningún documento literario. En algún momento tuvieron un Sūtra y varios comentarios 
puesto que se preservan fragmentos de estos textos en los trabajos de aquellos que los critican. En la literatura secun-
daria moderna se hace referencia a los Cārvākas  como “materialistas,” lo que es algo desafortunado. Es cierto que el 
texto Sūtra (a veces llamado Bārhaspatya Sūtra) acepta solo como principios (tattva) los cuatro elementos: tierra, agua, 
fuego, y aire; sin embargo, el término “materialismo” y sus cognados evocan en el mundo moderno asociaciones que 
no son necesariamente apropiadas para esta antigua escuela del pensamiento.
Palabras clave: Brahmins, Cārvākas, Vedic, Lokāyatas
Quem foram os Carvakas?
Resumo 
Um grande número de textos sânscritos, em sua maioria $losó$cos, refere-se aos Cārvākas o Lokāyatas (também 
Laukāyatikas, Lokāyatikas, Bārhaspatyas) que devem haber formado uma escola de pensamento que não deixou prati-
camente nenhum documento literário. Em algum tempo tiveram um texto Sūtra e vários comentários dos quais apenas 
fragmentos foram conservados nos trabalhos de aquelos que os criticam. Na literatura moderna secundária refere-se 
aos Cārvākas como “materialistas”, o qual é lamentável. É certo que o texto Sūtra (as vezes chamado Bārhaspatya 
Sūtra) aceita somente como princípios (tattva) os quatro elementos: terra, água, fogo e ar; No entanto o conceito 
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“materialismo” e suas cognatas causam no mundo moderno associações que não são necesariamente apropriadas para 
esta antiga escola do pensamento.    
Palavras-chave: Brahims, Cārvākas, Vedic, Lokāyatas 
Ancient traditions of the Lokāyatas or Cārvākas 
(Laukāyatikas, Lokāyatikas, Bārhaspatyas)2 way of thin-
king, developed greatly in the Vedic period, produced 
non-theist documents3 specially dedicated to epistemo-
logy. !e guiding principles were: rejection to all form 
of metaphysic truth and to accept only one way to know 
reality from the perception and other annexed processes 
like inference and/or analogy. In the majority of interpre-
tations and modern comments,4 they are located in the 
category of philosophical materialism;5 nevertheless, this 
statement misrepresents the true content of these schools.
For Marxist historians in particular, materialism is the 
opposite of idealism; the former is knowledge, the latter 
faith.6 !e latter kind of philosophers “worked in defence 
of obscurantism, irrationalism and scripture-mongering 
caste hatred”; the former were “struggling in their own 
way against the same ideological forces, though under 
limitations historically inevitable for them”.7 Idealism 
promotes faith, and faith is an instrument needed to 
maintain a society based on class antagonism and class 
exploitation.8 Materialism does the opposite, and there 
is therefore a tendency among some of these historians 
to associate this philosophy with the less privileged layers 
of society.
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya’s study Lokāyata (1959), 
for example, states in its introduction (p. xvii):
What then was the original Lokayata? ... Etymologically it 
means “that which is prevalent among the people” ... But the 
earliest of the available clues are hopelessly fragmentary and 
are too often embedded in mythological imagination. Never-
theless, a careful examination of some of these may give us a 
dim view of a primordial complex of a this-worldly outlook 
related to a body of ritual practices and the whole theme 
being somehow or other “prevalent” among the masses.
!is “humble beginning”, as he calls it, occupies much 
of Chattopadhyaya’s book. One fears that the modern 
associations of the term materialism have pushed at least 
some research of the Cārvākas into a direction that may 
not be appropriate to it.9
!ere is another reason to be careful with the expression 
“materialism”. It is far from certain that the emphasis of 
the Cārvāka philosophy was on the central role of the 
material elements. Among its other positions that are often 
cited in the texts is the rejection of what is called “another 
world”, which in practice primarily means the rejection of 
rebirth and karmic retribution. !e most often cited sūtra 
in this connection is: paralokino ‘bhāvāt paralokābhāvaᒒ 
“!ere is no other-world because of the absence of any 
other-worldly being (i.e., the transmigrating self ).”10 It 
shows that the rejection of the self was an element in the 
rejection of “another world”. And the rejection of the 
self was based on the view that the normal characteristics 
of the self, most notably consciousness, derive directly 
from the elements, so that there is no need for a self.11 
Seen in this way we have to consider the possibility that 
the materialist construction served the ultimate aim of 
rejecting rebirth and karmic retribution, more than a love 
of materialism per se. !is would put the Cārvākas in an 
altogether diZerent perspective: their aim would in that 
case primarily be negative, and the point of view they were 
concerned to reject would not be idealism or some such 
position, but the belief in “another world”.
!is change of emphasis $nds support elsewhere. !e 
Buddhists were concerned with the intellectual threat 
coming from the Cārvākas, not of course because they 
2. Franco & Preisendanz (1998: 179) note: “!ese terms seem to apply only to the followers, not to the school itself.” Pārthasārathi’s explanation of 
Kumārila’s expression lokāyatīkᒮtā (see below) suggests that lokāyata can be used as an adjective. Kᒮᒲᒤa Miśra’s Prabodhacandrodaya has the line 
sarvathā lokāyatam eva śāstram yatra pratyakᒲam eva pramāᒤam (p. 76; Pédraglio, 1974: 154); here lokāyata appears to be a noun that applies to the 
school, even though an adjectival interpretation is not impossible.
3. Jayarāśi’s Tattvopaplavasiᒢha “is the only text of the Lokāyata or Cārvāka school which has come down to us”, yet “[i]t is clear that there are important 
philosophical diZerences between Jayarāśi’s views and what usually goes under the name of Lokāyata philosophy”; Franco, 1987: 3-4.
4. For a very useful collection of fragments, see Bhattacharya, 2002. 
5. pᒮthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni; Bhattacharya, 2002: 603.
6. Cf. Ruben, 1979 (Wissen gegen Glauben)
7. Chattopadhyaya, 1976: vii-viii.
8. Chattopadhyaya, 1976: 212.
9. According to the Bibliography of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, there even exists a recent book called Charvaka Darshan: Ancient Indian 
Dalit Philosophy (Rao, 1997)
10. Bhattacharya, 2002: 605, 612.
11. tebhyaś caitanyam; Bhattacharya, 2002: 604.
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denied the soul, but because they denied “another world”. 
!ey reacted by writing against this position, sometimes 
in independent treatises called Paralokasiddhi “Proof of 
another world / rebirth”, or in sections of larger treatises.12 
Various Brahmanical authors, moreover, admit that their 
concern to prove the eternality of the soul has as ultimate 
aim to show that there is life after death.13
!ere is also an intriguing verse at the beginning of 
Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika which reads:14
For the most part Mīmāᒢsā has, in this world, been turned 
into Lokāyata. !is eZort of mine is made to take it to the 
path of the āstikas.
Ganga Nath Jha (1900: 2) translates this verse diZe-
rently, saying that Mīmāᒢsā “has been made Atheis[t]
ic”; Kumārila’s eZort, according to him, is “to turn it to 
the theistic path”.15 !is cannot however be correct. !e 
Lokāyatas are here, too, those who deny “another world”, 
and the āstikas are those who accept it.16 !is is con$rmed 
by Pārthasārathi’s comments on this verse:17
Mīmāᒢsā, though not being Lokāyata, has been turned 
into Lokāyata by Bhartᒮmitra and others by accepting the 
incorrect position according to which there is no fruit, desi-
red or not desired, of obligatory and forbidden [deeds] etc. 
!eism and atheism are clearly not envisaged here
Who, then, were these Cārvākas? Our texts rarely 
express themselves on this question, and concentrate all 
the more on the arguments for and against their positions. 
However, there are some exceptions, to which we now 
turn. One passage to be considered occurs in Śīlāᒣka›s 
Sūtrakᒮtāᒣgavᒮtti, a commentary written towards the 
end of the ninth century18 on the Jaina canonical text 
Sūyagaᒅa (Sūyagaᒅaᒢga; Skt. Sūtrakᒮtāᒣga). Śīlāᒣka on 
Sūy 1.1.1.6 comments the words ege samaᒤamāhaᒤā 
(“Certain Śramaᒤas and Brahmins”) as follows (p. 9):19
Certain Śramaᒤas, viz. Buddhists etc., and Brahmins who 
are followers of the opinions of the Bārhaspatya. 
!e Bārhaspatya is the Bārhaspatya Sūtra, the classical 
text of the Cārvākas. Śīlāᒣka indicates here that there are 
all kinds of Brahmins, some of whom are Cārvākas. !e 
implicit suggestion is that the Cārvākas are all, or most 
of them, Brahmins.
If this suggestion looks at $rst surprising, a number of 
other factors support it. Jayarāśi, the author of the only 
surviving work (Tattvopaplavasiᒢha) of the Lokāyata or 
Cārvāka school that has come down to us, calls himself 
in the concluding verses bhaᒷᒷaśrījayarāśidevaguru “guru 
Bhaᒷᒷa Śrī Jayarāśi Deva”.20 Another teacher of the school 
is known as Bhaᒷᒷa Udbhaᒷa. !e honori$c Bhaᒷᒷa indica-
tes that these two were Brahmins,21 perhaps Brahmin hou-
seholders.22 To this can be added that two other Cārvāka 
authors, Aviddhakarᒤa and Bhāvivikta, and perhaps also 
Udbhaᒷa, appear to have written Nyāya works as well.23 
Udbhaᒷa, moreover, was a grammarian in the Pāᒤinian 
tradition besides being a Cārvāka, and perhaps also an 
Ālaᒣkārika.24 All these teachers had therefore strong links 
to Brahmanical traditions.
Śīlāᒣka›s commentary has a further surprise in store. 
Under the immediately following verses of the Sūyagaᒅa 
it discusses at length the positions of the Cārvākas. Most 
surprising is that under verse 11 it cites, in support of their 
position, a Vedic passage, Bᒮhadāraᒤyaka Upaniᒲad 2.4.12, 
which it calls “their scriptural authority” (tadāgama):25 
“For this is their scriptural authority: ‘A single mass of 
perception, having arisen out of these elements, disappears 
after them: there is no awareness after death’”.
12. See Steinkellner, 1984; 1985; 1986; 1988; Franco, 1997.
13. Preisendanz (1994: II: 299 n. 79) mentions various authors (Vācaspati Miśra II, Keśava Miśra, Vardhamāna the author of the Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa, 
Bhāsarvajña, Jayanta Bhaᒷᒷa) for whom “[d]ie Tätigkeit im Hinblick auf weitere Existenz ... der letztendliche Zweck der ausserordentlichen Bemühun-
gen [ist], die Ewigkeit der Seele zu beweisen”. Cp. Tucci, 1923-29: 55.
14. Kumārila Bhaᒷᒷa, Ślokavārttika, Pratijñā v. 10: prāyeᒤaiva hi mīmāᒢsā loke lokāyatīkᒮtā / tām āstikapathe kartum ayaᒢ yatnaᒒ kᒮto mayā //
15. Similarly Tucci, 1923-29: 96 n. 3.
16. !is usage is quite common, especially among the Jainas; Haribhadra’s ᐀aᒅdarśanasamuccaya v. 77, for example, refers collectively to the doctrines of 
Buddhists, Jainas, Sāᒢkhyas, Jainas, Vaiśeᒲikas and Mīmāᒢsakas as āstikavāda “doctrines of the āstikas”. He then moves on to the Lokāyatas, who 
are nāstikas. Note further that the Kāśikā on P. 4.4.60 (astināstidiᒲᒷaᒢ matiᒒ), which accounts for the words āstika and nāstika in the senses “he who 
thinks ‘there is’” and “he who thinks ‘there is not’” respectively, adds (Kāś I p. 448): na ca matisattāmātre pratyaya iᒲyate, kiᒢ tarhi, paraloko ‘sti iti 
yasya matiᒒ sa āstikaᒒ / tadviparīto nāstikaᒒ /.
17. Pārthasārathi, Nyāyaratnākara p. 5: mīmāᒢsā hi bhartᒮmitrādibhir alokāyataiva satī lokāyatīkᒮtā nityaniᒲiddhayor iᒲᒷāniᒲᒷaᒢ phalaᒢ nāstītyādibahva
pasiddhāntaparigraheᒤeti. Note that lokāyata is here used as an adjective.
18. Winternitz, GIL II p. 318.
19. Śīlāᒣka, Sūtrakᒮtāᒣgavᒮtti, p. 9 (on Sūy 1.1.1.6: ege samaᒤamāhaᒤā): eke śramaᒤāᒒ śākyādayo bārhaspatyamatānusāriᒤaś ca brāhmaᒤāᒒ.
20. Jayarāśi, Tattvopaplavasiᒢha p. 125; Franco, 1987: 7.
21. See Solomon, 1978: 992.
22. See Slaje, 2007.
23. Franco, 1997: 142, with references to Steinkellner, 1961, and Potter, 1977: 281, 338-340; further Solomon, 1978: 990 f.
24. Solomon, 1978: 992; Bronkhorst, 2008.
25. Śīlāᒣka, Sūtrakᒮtāᒣgavᒮtti, p. 14 (on Sūy 1.1.1.11): tathā hi tadāgamaᒒ: vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaᒒ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati na pretya 
saᒢjñāstīti.
48 ½ Universidad de San Buenaventura, Cali - Colombia
Johannes Bronkhorst
Śīlāᒣka was not the only, nor indeed the $rst one, to 
connect the Cārvākas with this particular Vedic passage.26 
!e Āvaśyakaniryukti v. 600 speaks, in connection with 
the denial of the soul (jīva), of Vedic words that have 
been misunderstood (veyapayāᒤa ya atthaᒢ na yāᒤasī, 
Skt. vedapadānāᒢ cārthaᒢ na jānāsi). Its commentator 
Haribhadra (eighth century) cites in this connection (p. 
161-62) the same Upaniᒲadic passage and discusses it. Be-
fore him, in the sixth or seventh century, Jinabhadra does 
so in his Viśeᒲāvaśyakabhāᒲya. He refers to this passage in 
his verse 2043, and cites it in full in his own commentary 
(p. 354). !e commentator Koᒷyārya, commenting one 
or two centuries later27 on Viśeᒲāvaśyakabhāᒲya verses 
2404-06, cites this passage to show that the Veda so-
metimes agrees that “the other world” does not exist.28 
Kumārila (seventh century) mentions in his Ślokavārttika 
someone “who concludes on the basis of the Veda that 
there is no self”.29 His commentator Pārthasārathi Miśra 
(eleventh century) cites here the same Upaniᒲadic passa-
ge.30 Jayanta Bhaᒷᒷa, who like Śīlāᒣka wrote towards the 
end of the ninth century, cites the passage in the context 
of a Lokāyatika opponent who thinks that one should 
stop wasting one’s time talking about “another world”.31 
Elsewhere in the same work Jayanta expresses his concern 
that this Upaniᒲadic passage might support the Lokāyata 
position.32 At the end of the seventh Āhnika he returns 
once again to this Upaniᒲadic passage, connecting it with 
the pūrvapakᒲa, and then refers to other passages from the 
same Upaniᒲad according to which the self does not perish, 
and comments that that is the siddhānta.33 Malayagiri, 
in his Āvaśyakaniryuktivivaraᒤa of the twelfth century, 
and the author of the Sarvadarśanasaᒢgraha34 in the 
fourteenth, still connect the Cārvākas with this passage.35
Recall at this point that according to Kumārila and 
Pārthasārathi the Mīmāᒢsakas Bhartᒮmitra and others 
had turned Mīmāᒢsā into Lokāyata by accepting that 
there is no other world. !is was presumably not very di-
cult. Śabara›s Bhāᒲya discusses the meaning of “heaven” 
(svarga) under sūtras 6.1.1-2 and comes to the conclusion 
that heaven is “happiness” (prīti), not “a thing charac-
terised by happiness” (prītiviśiᒲᒷa dravya). !e popular 
notion according to which heaven is a very agreeable place 
where one goes after death is discarded. Put diZerently, 
in Śabara›s Mīmāᒢsā the belief in “another world” is 
not at all obvious. Śabara›s Mīmāᒢsā ignores everything 
that concerns rebirth and liberation; even its conception 
of heaven is compatible with a denial of life after death. 
Bhartᒮmitra’s explicit denial was therefore hardly a very 
revolutionary move within Mīmāᒢsa. We should not 
of course conclude from this that Cārvāka thought was 
identical with the Mīmāᒢsā of Śabara, Bhartᒮmitra or 
others, but nor should we lose sight of the fact that the 
two have points in common.
At this point some serious questions have to be addres-
sed. Aren’t the Cārvākas the greatest critics of the Vedic 
tradition? Aren’t they characterised by “$erce opposition 
to the religious Weltanschauung which had sacri$ces at 
its center”?36 Aren’t there verses attributed to them that 
ridicule the ritual and everything that is connected with 
the Veda? At the same time, we have seen that the Cārvākas 
presumably justi$ed their positions with the help of at 
least one Vedic quotation. It is not necessary to recall that 
the Buddhists and Jainas would never dream of justifying 
their positions with the help of Vedic quotations; even 
Brahmanical philosophers other than Mīmāᒢsakas and 
Vedāntins do not often do so. Why then do the Cārvākas, 
26. See Uno, 1999.
27. Balbir, 1993: 78 f.
28. Koᒷyārya, p. 439: vedo ‘pi “vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaᒒ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati” iti paralokanāstitvam anuvadati.
29. Kumārila, Ślokavārttika, Ātmavāda v. 140ab: vedād evātmanāstitvaᒢ yo nāma pratipadyate [...] I resolve ātmanāstitvam as ātma-nāstitvam, “non-
existence of the self”. !eoretically one might read ātmanā astitvam (or ātmana[ᒒ] astitvam, with incorrect sandhi!?); this is dicult to construe, but 
may lie behind Jha’s translation (p. 407): “One who would seek to know the Soul by the help of the Veda alone”.
30. Pārthasārathi, Nyāyaratnākara p. 513: yo vedavādī śiᒲyaᒒ, yo vā “vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaᒒ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati [na] pretya 
saᒢjñāsti”iti bhūtacaitanyābhidhānād vedavirodham ātmano manyate ... !e edition reads taᒢ pretya, which must be a mistake.
31. Jayanta Bhaᒷᒷa, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Varadacharya, vol. II p. 268: ayam api cāgamo ‘sty eva “vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaᒒ samutthāya tāny evānu 
vinaśyati na pretya saᒢjñāsti” iti / tad ātmano nityasya paralokino ‘bhāvāt kᒮtam etābhiᒒ apārthakapariśramakariᒤībhiᒒ paralokakathābhiᒒ /.
32. Jayanta Bhaᒷᒷa, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Varadacharya, vol. I p. 647: nanu ca lokāyatādyāgame ‘py evaᒢ prāmāᒤyaᒢ prāpnoti “vijñānaghana evaitebhyo 
bhūtebhyaᒒ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati na pretya saᒢjñāsti” iti vedamūladarśanāt.
33. Jayanta Bhaᒷᒷa, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Varadacharya, vol. II p. 358: yad vijñānaghanādivedavacanaᒢ tat pūrvapakᒲe sthitaᒢ, paurvāparyavimarśaśūnyahᒮdayaiᒒ 
so ‘rtho gᒮhītas tathā / maitreyyā paricoditas tu bhagavān yad yājñavalkyo ‘bravīt, ātmā naiva vinaśyatīti tad idaᒢ siddhāntasāraᒢ vacaᒒ //. !e other 
passages, as Cakradhara points out, are avināśī vā are ayam ātmā (BĀrUp(K) 4.5.14), aśīryo na hi śīryate (BĀrUp(K) 4.5.15), etc.
34. Sāyaᒤamādhava, Sarvadarśanasaᒢgraha p. 3 l. 25-27. Jayatilleke (1963: 69-70), too, concludes from this that “Materialist philosophy emerged within 
the Brāhmaᒤical fold”.
35. !is is not the only Vedic passage that is connected with the Cārvākas. Sadānanda’s Vedāntasāra (pp. 7-8) presents four diZerent Cārvākas who invoke 
three passages from the Taittirīya Upaniᒲad and one from the Chāndogya Upaniᒲad to justify their respective positions. !e fact that subsequently a 
Buddhist is introduced who justi$es his position with another passage from the Taittirīya Upaniᒲad shows that no historical conclusions should be 
drawn from this. Cf. Hillebrandt, 1916: 19 [347]; Tucci, 1923-29: 118-19.
36. Franco, 1987: 8.
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of all people, do so? And what does the partial similarity 
of Cārvāka thought and some forms of Mīmāᒢsā signify?
It is in this context important to recall Ramkrishna 
Bhattacharya’s following judicious remarks (2002: 599):
A look at the Cārvāka fragments collected to date reveals the 
fact that most of them are found in works written between 
the eighth and twelfth centuries CE. Although Cārvāka 
studies really began after the publication of the editio princeps 
of [the Sarvadarśanasaᒢgraha], it should be noted that this 
digest rarely quotes any Cārvāka aphorism that can be taken 
as genuine. It only purports to give, both in prose and verse, 
the essence of the Cārvāka philosophy, not in the words of 
any Cārvāka author, but as the learned fourteenth-century 
Vedāntin understood it. Nor does he mention the name of 
a single Cārvāka work, text or commentary (which he does 
profusely while dealing with other philosophical systems 
in the same work). So it may be admitted that all Cārvāka 
works had disappeared from India even before Sāyaᒤa-
mādhava’s time.37
!is makes sense where the collection of fragments is 
concerned, but also in the reconstruction of the philo-
sophy and, last but no least, in $nding out what others 
thought of the Cārvākas. Authors after, say, the twelfth 
century had no direct knowledge of the Cārvākas and 
their ideas any more. !ey felt free to attribute to them 
all manner of positions which they disapproved of. An 
inspection of the Cārvāka fragments collected by Bhatta-
charya shows that criticism of the Veda and its associated 
practices are virtually con$ned to ślokas, most of which 
are only cited in the Sarvadarśanasaᒢgraha, a text which 
is no longer acquainted with the school; other are cited in 
other late works, or they are simply not connected with 
the Cārvākas, so that we have no grounds for assuming 
that Cārvākas in particular are meant.38 None of the 
thirty extracts from the commentaries in his collection 
says anything against Vedic texts and practices. Of the 
eighteen sūtras collected two, according to Bhattacharya, 
deal with vedaprāmāᒤyaniᒲedhavāda, the rejection of Vedic 
authority. However, both these sūtras (unlike most others) 
are ambiguous and do not need to concern the Veda at 
all.39 What is more, they are only cited in Jayanta Bhaᒷᒷa’s 
Nyāyamañjarī, in a context which gives no hint as to their 
correct interpretation.40
It seems likely that the anti-Vedic element came to be 
attributed to the Cārvākas later on, probably at a time 
when they were no longer around to show how inappro-
priate this was. 
!is gives rise to the following interesting question. 
Do more recent sources also attribute this philosophy 
to non-Brahmins, to lower strata of society? Unfortuna-
tely the evidence concerning the social position of the 
Cārvākas is scarce, both for the earlier and for the more 
recent period. But there is at least one passage that fully 
con$rms this expectation. Guᒤaratna Sūri, the author 
of a commentary on Haribhadra’s ᐀aᒅdarśanasamuccaya 
called Tarkarahasyadīpikā, lived in the early $fteenth 
century. While introducing Haribhadra’s chapter on the 
Lokāyatas he states:41 
First the nature of the nāstikas will be explained. !e nāstikas 
are skull-bearing Yogins covered with ashes, and some 
[others], from Brahmins to Śūdras.42 !ey do not accept 
the soul, virtue and vice, etc.
Guᒤaratna does not dare to say, it seems, that the 
Cārvākas could not possibly be Brahmins. Perhaps the 
tradition connecting the two was still too strong in his 
days. But he includes lower strata of society, down to the 
lowest (antyaja), and we may read between the lines that 
the Brahmins who accepted this philosophy were no 
better than Śūdras. We may conclude that in Guᒤaratna’s 
time Cārvākas had become strawmen to whom one could 
attribute all that was reproachable and despicable.
37. !e appropriateness of the title of a recent work (Les matérialistes dans l’Inde ancienne; Ballanfat, 1997), which doubts the authenticity of the early 
Cārvāka quotations, and bases itself almost exclusively on the Sarvadarśanasaᒢgraha, is therefore questionable.
38. !is may in particular be true of Śl. 2 in Bhattacharya’s collection, which reads: agnihotraᒢ trayo vedās tridaᒤᒅaᒢ bhasmaguᒤᒷhanam / 
buddhipauruᒲahīnānāᒢ jīviketi bᒮhaspatiᒒ //. He translates: “Bᒮhaspati says — !e Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic’s three staves, and 
smearing one’s self with ashes, — (all these) are the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.” !is verse is cited in Cakradhara’s 
Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaᒣga (ed. Shah p. 75), without any indication as to its origin. !e name Bᒮhaspati is no guarantee that Cārvākas are here 
meant: recall that the followers of Bᒮhaspati are frequently referred to in the Arthaśāstra and elsewhere as thinkers who have certain views about 
politics and morality. !e Arthaśāstra attributes to them the view that “Vedic lore is only a cloak for one conversant with the ways of the world”; see 
below.
39. !ey are dharmo na kāryaᒒ and tad upadeśeᒲu na pratyetavyam (or tadupadeśeᒲu na pratyetavyam); Bhattacharya’s translations (“Religious act is not 
to be performed” and “Its (religion’s) instructions are not to be relied upon”) preserve the ambiguity.
40. Jayanta Bhaᒷᒷa, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Varadacharya, vol. I p. 647-48: nanu ca “yāvajjīvaᒢ sukhaᒢ jīvet” iti tatropadiśyate / evaᒢ “na svabhāvasiddhatvena, 
atropadeśavaiphalyāt”, “dharmo na kāryaᒒ”, “tadupadeśeᒲu na pratyetavyam” ity evaᒢ vā yad upadiśyate tat prativihitam eva pūrvapakᒲavacanamūlatvāt 
lokāyatadarśanasya / tathā ca tatra uttarabrāhmaᒤaᒢ bhavati “na vā are ahaᒢ mohaᒢ bravīmi avināśī vā are ‘yam ātmā mātrāsaᒢsargas tv asya bhavati” 
(BĀrUp(M) 4.5.14) iti /
41. Guᒤaratna Sūri, Tarkarahasyadīpikā, p. 450: prathamaᒢ nāstikasvarūpam ucyate / kāpālikā bhasmoddhūlanaparā yogino brāhmaᒤādyantyajāntāś ca 
kecana nāstikā bhavanti / te ca jīvapuᒤyapāpādikaᒢ na manyante /
42. Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya (1990: 266) translate: “!e Nāstikas are a kind of people, including Brahmins and ending with the low-born, 
who carry human skulls, smear their bodies with ashes and practise yoga”. !is translation does no justice to the word ca “and”.
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It is hard to say with precision when this change of 
attitude towards the Cārvākas had taken place. It was 
already there in the second half of the eleventh century, 
at the time of Kᒮᒲᒤa Miśra, the author of the allegorical 
drama called Prabodhacandrodaya.43 !e Cārvāka in this 
drama cites several of the anti-Vedic ślokas44 which also the 
Sarvadarśanasaᒢgraha associates with him. (It is however 
noteworthy that the Cārvāka in this play is a court philo-
sopher and friend of the king, whereas the other heterodox 
doctrines appear in the form of ridiculous monks: a Jaina 
monk, a Buddhist monk, and a Kāpālika.45) Already before 
Kᒮᒲᒤa Miśra, Vācaspati Miśra46 did not hesitate to call the 
Cārvākas inferior to animals (because more stupid than 
these), but this may not tell us much about their position 
in society according to this author.
We have come to think that the Lokāyata position 
was primarily the denial of “another world”, without 
anti-Vedic overtones. We have even seen that Mīmāᒢsā 
in one of its forms had been very close to this school 
of thought. All this has interesting implications. Most 
schools of Indian philosophy have the belief in rebirth 
and karmic retribution as a shared presupposition. !is 
belief is common to practically all surviving schools, 
however much they may diZer in other respects. !is is 
noteworthy, for the oldest texts of Brahmanism, which 
together constitute the Veda, do not know this belief 
until their most recent parts. Some Brahmins adopted 
this belief in the late-Vedic period, with the result that 
it started $nding expression in late-Vedic texts from the 
earliest Upaniᒲads onward, but clearly not all Brahmins 
were convinced. Brahmanical orthodoxy as incorporated 
in the the Mīmāᒢsā school of hermeneutics had not yet 
accepted this belief around the middle of the $rst millen-
nium of the Common Era and later. We can be sure that 
many other Brahmins, too, took centuries to adopt this 
way of looking at the world. It also seems likely that this 
process, which for some may have taken a thousand years 
or longer, was sometimes marked by discussions between 
those who did and those who did not accept this doctrine. 
!e Mīmāᒢsā school of hermeneutics does not reject the 
doctrine in its classical text, the Śābara Bhāᒲya; it ignores 
it. It does not therefore participate in the debate which 
we assume may have taken place at its time. All the other 
philosophical schools of which texts survive accept this 
doctrine as if there were no problem. It looks as if only 
those Brahmins who accepted this doctrine participated 
in the philosophical debate, the single exception being 
the Mīmāᒢsakas, who kept silent. What happened to all 
those other followers of the Vedic tradition who were in 
no hurry to open up to those completely non-Vedic ideas? 
Where they excluded from the discussion?
It is here, I suggest, that the Cārvākas and like-minded 
people $t in. !is suggestion implies, of course, that the 
Cārvākas were primarily Brahmins rather than represen-
tatives of the “lower classes”. !ese Brahmins resisted the 
encroachment of the new ideology of rebirth and karmic 
retribution with arguments of a materialistic nature. 
Rejecting the “other world” in the form of rebirth and 
karmic retribution, they had to abandon the belief in a 
Vedic heaven as well, because the same arguments cut both 
ways; however, this was no great sacri$ce, for the “other-
worldly” dimension of the heaven which is presumably 
brought about by the Vedic sacri$ce was not strong. Since 
more and more Brahmin thinkers joined the other side in 
this debate (the side of rebirth and karmic retribution), the 
Cārvākas found themselves more and more isolated and 
in the end abandoned by all, including other Brahmins.
A review of earlier passages which criticise rebirth and 
karmic retribution does not add much to our conclusions 
so far. Criticism against this position is found in the Budd-
hist canon, even though not in connection with the ex-
pressions “Cārvāka” and “Lokāyata”; the latter of these two 
terms appears to be used in a diZerent sens here.47 But we 
$nd an emphatic con$rmation of the truth of this doctrine 
in the $rst two of three “knowledges” which play a role in 
the enlightenment of the Buddha.48 Denial of this doctrine 
is put in the mouth of a certain Ajita Keśakambalin in the 
Pāli canon, and is associated with other names in other 
versions of the canon.49 Critics of the doctrine $gure in 
one of the oldest texts of the (Śvetāśvara) Jaina canon.50 
!en there is the story of king Pāyāsi or Paesi, preserved by 
the Buddhists and the Jainas respectively;51 this king does 
43. Pédraglio, 1974: 3 sq.
44. P. 77 sq.; Pédraglio, 1974: 156 sq.
45. Pédraglio, 1974: 20. Note that Guᒤaratna’s description of certain Lokāyatas as skull-bearing (kāpālika) contradicts Kᒮᒲᒤa Miśra’s distinction between 
the Cārvāka and the Kāpālika.
46. Vācaspati Miśra, Bhāmatī, p. 766 (on 3.3.54): nāstikas tu paśor api paśur iᒲᒷāniᒲᒷasādhanam avidvān. Cp. Jayanta Bhaᒷᒷa, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Vara-
dacharya, vol. I p. 317: tatrānumānasvarūpaᒢ cāśakyanihnavam eva, sarvalokaprasiddhatvāt/ abalābālagopālahālikapramukhā api / budhyante niyatād 
arthāt arthāntaram asaᒢśayam //. Cf. Bhattacharya, 1999a: 490.
47. Rhys Davids, 1889; Franke, 1913: 19 n. 3; Bhattacharya, 1998; 2000; Franco & Preisendanz, 1998: 178-179.
48. Bareau, 1963: 75-91; Demiéville, 1927; Schopen, 1983.
49. See MacQueen, 1984: 295 Z.; 1988: 152-153; Meisig, 1987: 124 Z.
50. Sūy 1.1.1.6-8; 11-12 (ed. tr. Bollée, 1977: 14, 15, 60, 64); 2.1.15 (tr. Jacobi, 1895: 339-40)
51. See Leumann, 1885; Bollée, 2002
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not believe in existence after death.52 A number of more 
recent texts, too, are acquainted with deniers of rebirth 
and karmic retribution, without mentioning the Lokāyata 
Sūtra in this context. Among these may be mentioned 
the Carakasaᒢhitā,53 certain passages in the Mahābhārata 
and in the Viᒲᒤudharmottara Purāᒤa (1.108.12-20);54 this 
last case is particularly interesting, because the heretical 
position is here attributed to a lokāyatika king called Vena. 
In Āryaśūra›s Jātakamālā ch. 29 it is king Aᒣgadinna of 
Videha who believes that there is no “other world”. In a 
passage from the Laᒣkāvatāra Sūtra the king of the Nāgas 
presents himself to the Buddha in the form of a Brahmin 
and states that there is no other world.55 !e Nyāya Sūtra 
provides arguments in support of former existences in 
sūtras 3.1.18-26.56 
!ese passages (to which others could be added) tell 
us very little about the social background of the critics 
of rebirth and karmic retribution: some say nothing 
whatsoever about their social identity, others attribute this 
critical attitude to a king, one to a king of the Nāgas who 
had adopted the appearance of a Brahmin. !e repeated 
appearance of kings in these passages yet reminds us of the 
fact that kings played an important role in the cultural life 
of India, especially during the millennium or so from 500 
BCE to 500 CE. Kings during this period had courts and 
capitals, and these courts and capitals attracted Brahmins, 
i.e., certain Brahmins. Urbanisation started (again, after 
the earlier Indus civilisation) around 500 BCE, ourished 
from 200 BCE onward, and continued until it started to 
decline under and after the Guptas from the middle of 
the $rst millennium onward.57 
!e attitude of traditional Brahmins with regard to 
cities was negative, as is well-known from literature. !e 
Vedic Brahmins did not like cities, and preferred to live 
in the countryside, where they could preserve their ritual 
purity. Various Dharma Sūtras and other texts con$rm 
this. !e Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra, for example, states: 
“‘A man who keeps himself well under control will attain 
$nal bliss even if he lives in a city with his body covered 
with the city dust and his eyes and face coated with it’ 
— now that is something impossible.”. 58 !e Āpastamba 
Dharma Sūtra, similarly, enjoins: “He should also avoid 
visiting cities.”59 Several Saᒢnyāsa Upaniᒲads, which may 
belong to a slighly later period, contain the following 
advice: “He shall avoid ... capital cities as he would the 
Kumbhīpāka hell.”60 These Upaniᒲads know various 
terms for towns of various sizes, such as pattana, pura 
and nagara,61 which shows that the cities were there, but 
the Brahmins addressed in these texts did not like them. 
!ese rural Brahmins, we may assume, concentrated on 
their traditional rites, and ignored, or tried to ignore, the 
new ideas that were gaining ground.
But there were also Brahmins in the cities, where they 
aspired to positions such as that of purohita or councillor 
to the king, or engaged in other activities. !ese were 
the Brahmins who wrote, and read, the Arthaśāstra, the 
Kāmasūtra, the courtly literature which has been preser-
ved, and no doubt much else. Information about these 
urban Brahmins can be obtained from the Arthaśāstra. 
Kangle (1965: 144 f.) sums it up in the following words:
Special privileges are intended for [the Brahmin], particularly 
for a Śrotriya, that is, a Brahmin learned in the Vedas. It is 
recommended, for example, that land free from taxes and 
$nes should be granted to a Śrotriya, just as such lands are to 
be granted to the priests and preceptors of the ruler (2.1.7). 
It is also laid down that the property of a Śrotriya, even when 
he dies without an heir, cannot escheat to the state like the 
property of other citizens (3.5.28). Brahmins in general 
are, it seems, to be exempted from payment at ferries and 
pickets (3.20.14). In many cases, punishment for oZences 
is made dependent on the varᒤa of the oZender. In cases of 
abuse, defamation, assault etc., an ascending scale of $nes is 
prescribed in accordance with the oZender’s varᒤa (Chapters 
3.18 and 3.19). ... Discrimination on the basis of varᒤa is 
referred to in connection with the oath to be administered to 
witnesses (3.11.34-37), in the matter of inheritance by sons 
born of wives belonging to diZerent varᒤas (3.6.17-20) and 
so on. Again, the varᒤas are to occupy diZerent residential 
areas in the city, the Brahmins in the north, the Kᒲatriyas 
in the east and so on (2.4.9-15). It is also laid down that 
52. Bronkhorst, 2003
53. Carakasaᒢhitā, Sūtrasthāna 11.6-33; cf. Meindersma, 1990; Filliozat, 1993; Preisendanz, 1994: II: 307 Z.
54. Bhattacharya, 1999; Hopkins, 1901: 86 Z.
55. Laᒣkāvatāra Sūtra, ed. Vaidya p. 73 l. 1-3, ed. Nanjio p. 179: atha khalu kᒲᒮᒤapakᒲiko nāgarājo brāhmaᒤarūpeᒤāgatya bhagavantam etad avocat: tena 
hi gautama paraloka eva na saᒢvidyate.
56. See the relevant portions of Preisendanz, 1994 (where the sūtras are numbered 17-25).
57. Cp. !apar, 2002: 245 f., 456 f.
58. Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra 2.6.33: purareᒤukuᒤᒷhitaśarīras tatparipūrᒤanetravadanaś ca / nagare vasan suniyatātmā siddhim avāpsyatīti na tad asti //; 
text and translation, Olivelle, 2000: 264-265.
59. Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra 1.32.21: nagarapraveśanāni ca varjayet //; text and translation, Olivelle, 2000: 72-73.
60. Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniᒲad ch. 7, ed. Dikshitar p. 116, ed. Schrader p. 199-200; Bᒮhat-saᒢnyāsa Upaniᒲad ed. Schrader p. 268: tyajet ... rājadhānīᒢ
kumbhīpākam iva; tr. Olivelle, 1992: 214, 253-254.
61. See e.g. Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniᒲad ed. Dikshitar p. 81, ed. Schrader p. 159: ekarātraᒢ vased grāme pattane tu dinatrayam / pure dinadvayaᒢ bhikᒲur 
nagare pañcarātrakam // “A mendicant may spend one night in a village, two in a burg, three in a town, and $ve in a city.” tr. Olivelle, 1992: 187.
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in social matters seniority shall be $xed from the Brahmin 
downwards. And the Brahmin is declared to be free to refuse 
contributions to common festivals and yet entitled to take 
full part in them (3.10.43-44). !ere can be no doubt about 
th high status enjoyed by the Brahmin as such, or about the 
privileges and concessions reserved for him.
It is more than likely that the Arthaśāstra paints a far 
too attractive picture of the privileges of the Brahmins, 
but this is no doubt due to the fact that Brahmins were 
involved in trying to inuence public life at and around 
the royal court; they had to convince the king that it was 
his task to instal and maintain “the law laid down in the 
Vedic lore which is bene$cial, as it prescribes the respective 
duties of the four varᒤas and the four āśramas”.62 !ey may 
or may not have obtained all the privileges they wanted, 
but the for us important fact is that they were there, at 
the courts and in the cities. !ese were urban Brahmins, 
who should not be confused with those other Brahmins 
who stayed as far as possible from urban centres, in the 
countryside where they stuck to their Vedic traditions.63
In view of the above it seems justi$ed to distinguish for 
this period two kinds of Brahmins who may have been 
rather diZerent from each other: the rural ones and the 
urban ones. !e rural ones could, more than the urban 
ones, continue their traditional life styles, and remain 
relatively aloof from developments in the urban world. 
!e urban Brahmins, on the other hand, had to compete 
for the favours of the king, and stay au courant in various 
other ways.64 !ey might be cynical with regard to their 
Brahmanical status, but they could not give it up, because 
it was their main claim to privilege.65
A remark in the Arthaśāstra, a text characterised by 
straight talk, may illustrate this. It speaks about the 
Bārhaspatyas (diZerent, it seems, from the Cārvākas 
who also came to be known by that name), and says the 
following about them:66
‘!e science of material welfare and the science of govern-
ment and politics [are the only sciences],’ say the followers 
of Bᒮhaspati. For the Vedic lore is only a cloak for one 
conversant with the ways of the world.
It is clear from the context that the Bārhaspatyas do 
not accept “the science of the three Vedas” (trayī). But 
far from making an issue of this, they are of the opinion 
that “the Vedic lore is only a cloak for one conversant 
with the ways of the world” (saᒢvaraᒤamātraᒢ hi trayī 
lokayātrāvida[ᒒ]).67 As far as I can see, this can mean only 
one thing. !ese Bārhaspatyas kept their convictions as to 
the real ecacy of the three Vedas to themselves, because 
they did not wish to lose the advantages which they deri-
ved from this knowledge. !is implies, of course, that they 
were Brahmins, but cynical Brahmins. Not all Brahmins 
were Bārhaspatyas, to be sure, and not all were as cynical, 
we may presume. Yet this remark may give an impression 
of the attitude of at least some urban Brahmins.
!ese urban Brahmins had to face the brunt of the 
onslaught of the new ideas of rebirth and karmic retri-
bution, for the kingly courts, and the cities, were natural 
focal points for diZerent ideologies to confront each other. 
!e life of these Brahmins may have left them little space 
for traditional rites, but they would not be able to ignore 
the confrontation with the new ideas about rebirth and 
karmic retribution. It is in the surroundings of the royal 
court, including the capital city, that we may have to look 
for Brahmins who took up the challenge and responded to 
it in a coordinated fashion. !ey, or some of them, fought 
back. !ey rejected the belief in rebirth, and the existence 
of “another world” in general. Sometimes they may have 
succeeded in convincing their king; in such cases their 
opponents might associate this for them heretical point 
of view with a king: Pāyāsi, Paesi, Vena, or someone else.
In the long run they did not however succeed, at least 
not in this particular respect. As Brahmins they succeeded 
in gaining the social dominance which came to characte-
rise future centuries almost throughout the subcontinent. 
!e battle against the doctrine of rebirth and karmic 
retribution, on the other hand, they lost. Later centuries 
62. Arthaśāstra 1.3.4: eᒲa trayīdharmaś caturᒤāᒢ varᒤānām āśramāᒤāᒢ ca svadharmasthāpanād aupakārikaᒒ. Tr. Kangle, 1972: 7, modi$ed.
63. It is in this context interesting to see that an insertion in the Harivaᒢśa (327*, after 21.34, p. 148) speaks of an nāstivādārthaśāstra taught by Bᒮhaspati 
in order to confuse Indra’s enemies (Hillebrandt, 1916: 20 [348]).
64. Cp. Tucci, 1923-29: 67: “Il brahmano dunque, modello d’ogni perfezione ideale, tanto più veniva apprezzato, quanto più vasto il suo sapere: era 
ben naturale quindi che, cresciuta la sua importanza, vivendo all’ombra delle corti e dei potenti, destinato spesso ai più alti uci, esso dovesse essere 
esperto anche nelle arti utili alla vita o nel governo dei popoli o in tutte quelle cognizioni scienti$che che potessero servire ad un pratico sfruttamento: 
purohita e mantrin erano ugualmente brahmani, che guidavano e consigliavano i principi nel disbrigo delle pubbliche cose ...”
65. Franco and Preisendanz (1998: 179) observe: “It is quite possible, though not yet provable, that Indian materialism developed in kingly and state 
administration circles as an alternative worldview counterbalancing that of the priestly class.” If our reections are justi$ed, the $rst part of Franco and 
Preisendanz’s observation (“Indian materialism developed in kingly and state administration circles”) is correct, whereas the second part (“materialism 
... as an alternative worldview counterbalancing that of the priestly class”) is not.
66. Arthaśāstra 1.2.4-5: vārttā daᒤᒅanītiś ceti bārhaspatyāᒒ / saᒢvaraᒤamātraᒢ hi trayī lokayātrāvida iti /. Tr. Kangle, 1972: 6, modi$ed.
67. !is interpretation is no doubt to be preferred to the one proposed by Tucci (1923-29: 68, 80), according to which Vedic lore is merely an obstacle 
for those who know the ways of the world (“La teologia è soltanto un ostacolo per chi conosce l’andamento del mondo”).
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would depict the early defenders of the Vedic tradition 
against this onslaught as being themselves critics of the 
Vedic tradition. !e Cārvākas would turn in their graves 
if they knew.
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